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Note 
S.A.S. v. France: A Margin of Appreciation Gone Too 
Far 
NATHANIEL FLEMING 
When is it permissible for a government to infringe on the religious rights of its 
citizenry? When is such infringement necessary for a democracy? This is the central 
concept underlying the margin of appreciation—a standard utilized by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to determine whether certain human 
rights violations may be excused as “necessary in a democratic society.” While such 
an approach certainly has its benefits—particularly considering that the ECHR is 
an international body seeking to intervene in national politics—it also leaves 
unresolved the question of the outer limits of such a standard. How far may a nation 
violate religious rights, and who should determine those limits? 
In S.A.S. v. France, the ECHR confronted this very issue and concluded that 
the French prohibition on the public wearing of full-face veils—popularly described 
as a “Burqa Ban”—was necessary in a democratic society. The basis for the 
decision relied upon France’s argument that Muslim women who wear the veil are 
incapable of socializing with their fellow citizens, which thereby inhibits their ability 
to fully engage with civic society. In accepting France’s justification, the ECHR had 
to overlook the wealth of evidence to the contrary in favor of accepting an 
unsubstantiated and stereotypical belief that veil-wearing Muslim women are not 
functioning members of a democratic society. At its core, the decision in S.A.S. 
permitted France to firmly establish majoritarian cultural norms, rooted heavily in 
Christianity, to the detriment of its Muslim minority population. This was a margin 
of appreciation gone too far. 
This Note aims to highlight numerous critiques of the ECHR’s decision in 
S.A.S. and examine its aftermath in European politics. As will be seen, the standard 
set forth by S.A.S. is counter to the very principles upon which the ECHR was 
established. The court has permitted France to selectively favor the rights of some 
citizens, rather than the rights of all its citizens. Worse still, S.A.S. has encouraged 
other European nations to follow in France’s stead, and there is a growing trend in 
favor of abrogating the religious rights of the Muslim population. If this trend is to 
stop, the margin of appreciation must change. 





INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 919 
I. THE HISTORY OF S.A.S. V. FRANCE ................................................. 920 
A. THE POLITICS BEHIND A “BURQA BAN” ....................................... 920 
B. THE INEVITABLE LITIGATION ....................................................... 922 
C. THE AFTERMATH OF S.A.S. ......................................................... 926 
II. INTERPRETING S.A.S. ....................................................................... 927 
A. SECULARISM ............................................................................... 927 
B. FORCED ASSIMILATION................................................................ 931 
C. COUNTER-FACTUALISM ............................................................... 935 
III. S.A.S. AND THE WIDE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION ................... 938 








343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   390 7/28/20   10:49 AM
 
 
S.A.S. v. France: A Margin of Appreciation Gone Too 
Far 
NATHANIEL FLEMING * 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) was created, the drafters sought to 
establish different standards of review depending on the right that was at 
issue. While infringing on the rights against torture was absolutely 
unreasonable, the signatory states were granted more deference in the rights 
of expression and religion. For the latter rights, the Convention recognized 
that a state may permissibly infringe upon those rights, so long as the 
infringement was “necessary in a democratic society.”1 The European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) later dubbed this concept as the “margin of 
appreciation.”2 While this doctrine has enabled state suppression of certain 
fundamental rights, logically there must be some limit to the margin of 
appreciation in order to uphold the Convention and actually protect these 
rights. However, the 2014 decision in S.A.S. v. France suggests otherwise. 
The margin of appreciation applied by the ECHR in S.A.S. authorized France 
to restrict the religious liberties of Muslim women and ban the veil3 in order 
to protect the supposed rights of other French citizens to socialize with these 
women.4 This Note considers the aftermath of this decision and challenges 
whether the ECHR is truly capable of preserving religious freedoms as the 
margin of appreciation now stands. 
Part I discusses the factual history of S.A.S., including the political 
interests that instituted the ban on the veil, and the holding of the ECHR. 
This section also examines the aftermath of S.A.S. and the spread of similar 
bans throughout the continent in the four years since the decision. Part II 
considers three prominent critiques of S.A.S.: that French secularism 
represented in S.A.S. violates religious freedom; that the holding in S.A.S. 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2019; Vassar College, B.A. in Political Science 
and History. I would like to thank Professor Mark Janis for inspiring me to write on this topic, providing 
wonderful guidance, and assisting me in reviewing an earlier draft of this Note. Special thanks to my 
colleagues at the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful and meticulous editing of this Note. 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950.  
2 E.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976, 
¶ 57. 
3 Veil, as used throughout both S.A.S. and this Note, is shorthand for both the burqa, which covers 
the entire face, and the niqab, which covers all but the eyes. 
4 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), ¶ 155 [hereinafter S.A.S.]. 
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920 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
authorizes forced assimilation of cultural minorities; and that S.A.S. 
emboldens counter-factualism in European politics. Part III examines these 
critiques to determine the common cause of these issues. Lastly, this Note 
concludes that the ECHR’s application of the margin of appreciation is 
unsustainable in order to preserve democracy and protect religious liberty. 
I. THE HISTORY OF S.A.S. V. FRANCE 
A. The Politics Behind a “Burqa Ban” 
The conflict displayed in S.A.S. arose five years before the ECHR 
ultimately decided the issue. In 2009, the Presidents of the National 
Assembly––the lower house of the French parliament––began developing 
legislation to restrict the usage of full-face veils.5 Although France does not 
maintain census data of racial or ethnic categories,6 the National Assembly 
reported that only 1900 women wore the veil—90% of whom were under 
age forty, two-thirds were French nationals, and one-in-four were recent 
converts to Islam.7 The report further claimed that the use of the veil was 
untethered to actual religious expression and, instead, stemmed from 
extremist fundamentalist traditions.8 Seizing on this notion of extremism, 
the report concluded that the veil is incompatible with values of the French 
Republic: liberty, equality, and fraternity.9 Ostensibly, the veil denied liberty 
because it was a form of subservience, negated gender equality, and, most 
importantly, outright negated contact with others and violated the French 
ideal of “living together.”10 Consequently, the report concluded that it was 
necessary to “release women from the subservience of the full-face veil” and 
create a ban on wearing the veil.11 
Relying on this report, the National Assembly first unanimously adopted 
a resolution opposing the use of the veil in 2010.12 While restating many of 
the core conceits of the report, the resolution prioritized ending gender 
discrimination and protecting women who were forced to wear the veil.13 
Soon thereafter, both houses of the French parliament passed a 
comprehensive ban on the veil with only one vote in opposition.14 The law 
boldly proclaimed that “[n]o one may, in public places, wear clothing that is 
                                                                                                                     
5 Id. ¶ 15. 
6 Alexander Stile, Can the French Talk About Race?, NEW YORKER (July 11, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-the-french-talk-about-race. 
7 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 16. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. ¶ 17. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. ¶ 24. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. ¶ 27. 
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2020] S.A.S. V. FRANCE 921 
designed to conceal the face.”15 If someone violated this law—in other 
words, if any woman were caught wearing a veil—she would be subject to 
a citizenship course and a fine.16 Although a partial ban on the veil was 
considered, the legislative history reflects a belief that any less restrictive 
measure would not adequately satisfy the legislative priorities for banning 
the veil.17 Moreover, the law included numerous exceptions for health, 
occupation, sports, and festivities and artistic or traditional events.18 For 
instance, this ban would not apply to head coverings during a religious 
procession.19 The French constitutional court later added an exemption for 
wearing full-face coverings in places of worship.20 Lastly, the new law 
included a new provision to the Criminal Code that would punish anyone 
who “forces one or more other persons to conceal their face, by threat, 
duress, coercion, abuse of authority or of office, on account of their 
gender.”21 This punishment included a year of imprisonment and a 
substantial fine of 30,000 euros.22 
When the French ban went into effect in 2011, few other European 
nations had comparable bans. Mere months after France’s ban was passed, 
Belgium passed a comparable law that likewise banned full or substantial 
face coverings in public.23 The ECHR describes the Belgian law as a 
comparably broad blanket ban on any face coverings while in public.24 The 
legislative history showed the law was even similarly premised on the notion 
that women who wear the veil are incapable of “living together” with other 
members of their society.25 The Belgian Constitutional Court ultimately 
upheld this law.26 In addition, two other European nations attempted similar 
laws. While the Dutch parliament proposed four separate bans on wearing 
full-face veils in public, the Dutch constitutional court ultimately struck 
down each proposal.27 Similarly, in Spain, a number of municipalities 
attempted citywide bans on full-face veils that were eventually defeated at 
the Spanish Supreme Court.28 In both Spain and the Netherlands, the 
                                                                                                                     
15 Id. ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Act No 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 
Prohibiting the Concealing of the Face in Public, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION 
IN EUROPE, https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/20201 (unofficial translation of the French 
law, which prohibits concealing the face in public and describes consequences). 
16 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 28. 
17 Id. ¶ 25. 
18 Id. ¶ 28. 
19 Id. ¶ 31. 
20 Id. ¶ 30. 
21 Id. ¶ 29. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
24 Id. ¶ 41. 
25 Id. ¶ 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. ¶ 49. 
28 Id. ¶ 43. 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   393 7/28/20   10:49 AM
 
922 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
constitutional courts rejected the same justifications articulated by France in 
support of its ban.29 Both courts found no support for the belief that the veil 
is incompatible with the social order.30 Moreover, the Spanish court added 
that this ban would have the counterproductive effect of driving veil-wearing 
women into hiding and intensifying the discrimination against them.31 
In international law, many organizations also disagreed with the French 
approach. While the Council of Europe agreed that ending the subjugation 
of women forced to wear the veil was a sensible goal, it contended that a 
general prohibition would have negative repercussions.32 Rather than 
liberating women, the Council of Europe noted that a general ban would 
likely force women who choose to wear a veil to confine themselves at 
home.33 The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
concurred, while also noting the dearth of evidence in support of France’s 
contention that the veil undermines democracy.34 The Commissioner even 
linked the perceptions of the veil to Islamophobia and concluded that these 
bans undermine multiculturalism, an essential European value.35 
Nonetheless, despite opposition to the ban from members of the international 
community, the French parliament created a new paradigm for the 
relationship between European Muslims and their nation. With this ban, 
France laid the groundwork for an inevitable challenge to the ECHR. 
B. The Inevitable Litigation 
Although decided in 2014, the S.A.S. litigation began the day that 
France’s ban went into effect in 2011.36 S.A.S., then a twenty-four-year-old 
French national, was a devout Muslim who personally elected to wear the 
burqa or niqab at various times.37 S.A.S. followed “the Sunni cultural 
tradition” and ascribed to the belief that “it is customary and respectful for 
women to wear a full-face veil in public.”38 In particular, S.A.S. wished to 
be able to wear her veil in public to express her own faith during religious 
events, including the month-long observation of Ramadan.39 Alongside her 
application, S.A.S. submitted a statement describing the effects of the ban 
that she experienced personally. She wrote: 
                                                                                                                     
29 Id. ¶¶ 47, 51. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. ¶ 47. 
32 Id. ¶ 35. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. ¶ 37. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. ¶ 1; Steven Erlanger, France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12france.html. 
37 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶¶ 10, 11. 
38 Id. ¶ 76. 
39 Id. ¶ 12. 
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I am now vilified and attacked on the streets of the Republic I 
love, effectively reduced to house arrest, virtually ostracized 
from public life and marginalized. . . . [C]riminalisation, or 
rather the political scaremongering that preceded it, has incited 
members of the public to now openly abuse and attack me 
whenever I drive wearing my veil. Pedestrians and other 
drivers routinely now spit on my car and shout sexual 
obscenities and religious bigotry. Consequently, I now feel 
like a prisoner in my own Republic, as I no longer feel able to 
leave my house unless it is essential. I leave the house less 
frequently as a result. I wear my veil with even less frequency 
when out in public as a result. Indeed, I also feel immense guilt 
that I am forced to no longer remain faithful to my core 
religious values.40 
This fear of harassment motivated S.A.S. to remain anonymous41 when 
she sued France alleging that France violated her rights to freedom of 
religion and expression protected by articles 8 and 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.42  
In her arguments, S.A.S. contended that France’s assumptions of the veil 
were entirely baseless and rooted in stereotype.43 Contrary to the beliefs 
articulated by the French parliament, S.A.S. asserted that “the veil often 
denoted women’s emancipation, self-assertion and participation in 
society.”44 To S.A.S., wearing the veil was not about appeasing men, but 
rather was done to satisfy herself and her own conscience.45 Rather than 
recognize these different perspectives, France adopted a paternalistic 
approach declaring the implicit values of the religious expression of a 
minority culture.46 Moreover, the purpose of the ban was compromised by 
its actualization: the law was supposed to protect women from subjugation, 
yet it created a punishment for the same women it sought to protect.47 Lastly, 
the exceptions provided by the law unfairly favored Christians.48 The 
exceptions, premised in the context of a Christian majority, were written 
such that they allowed face coverings during common Christian festivities 
while prohibiting Muslim women from wearing the veil during the month of 
Ramadan.49 Altogether, S.A.S.’s arguments painted the portrait of a nation 
                                                                                                                     
40 Eva Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 58, 60–61 (2016). 
41 Id. at 61. 
42 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 74. 
43 Id. ¶ 77. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. ¶ 78. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. ¶ 80. 
49 Id.  
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so devoted to the values of a Christian majority that it would rather compel 
assimilation than accept a diversity of cultural beliefs. 
Expectedly, France countered S.A.S.’s arguments with a number of 
reasons to claim that its actions fell within the margin of appreciation 
accorded by articles 8 and 9.50 Drawing on the legislative history, France 
raised claims that it was merely seeking gender equality or protecting public 
safety.51 The ECHR quickly dispatched these claims.52 However, France’s 
argument that the veil impaired the ideal of “living together” held greater 
sway with the court.53 Here, France contended that, as a result of concealing 
one’s face, a person was effectively breaking social ties and refusing to live 
together with other members of French society.54 Thus, it was necessary for 
France to prohibit full-face coverings when these garments undermined this 
core notion of French civic engagement.55 
Ultimately, the ECHR accepted France’s notion of “living together” and 
found no violation of articles 8 or 9.56 While incorporating France’s 
argument, the court reasoned that in order to protect this need to live 
together––recontextualized as “respect for the minimum requirements of life 
in a society”––France was effectively protecting the rights of others.57 Put 
differently, France was protecting the rights of its non-veil wearing citizens 
to socialize with women that would otherwise be wearing a veil. Solely 
under these grounds, the court found that the law was justified to preserve 
“the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living 
together easier.”58 Thus, in accepting the legitimacy of France’s “living 
together” argument, the court swiftly dismissed concerns over the breadth 
and impact of this ban since it was necessary to uphold a cornerstone of 
French society.59 Indeed, as the court succinctly concluded, “France had a 
wide margin of appreciation in the present case,”60 and could abrogate the 
religious freedom of S.A.S. in pursuit of its goal.  
While the fifteen-judge majority swiftly glossed over S.A.S.’s 
arguments, the dissenting opinion accorded far greater weight to S.A.S.’s 
concerns. When the majority sided with France, it bizarrely claimed that the 
central purpose of the ban was not “to protect women against a practice 
                                                                                                                     
50 Id. ¶¶ 81, 84. 
51 Id. ¶ 82. 
52 Id. ¶¶ 115–18. 
53 See id. ¶ 82 (expanding on the theory that the veil could break social ties and result in a refusal 
to conform with the rest of society). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. ¶¶ 157–59. 
57 Id. ¶¶ 121–22. 
58 Id. ¶¶ 122, 142. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 151–52. 
60 Id. ¶ 155. 
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which was imposed on them.”61 As the dissent demonstrated, this argument 
completely ignores the fact that the legislative history repeatedly referred to 
the veil as a “form of subservience” and sought to liberate women from this 
subjugation.62 Moreover, with little justification, the majority ignored 
S.A.S.’s own positive perception of the veil. Instead, the majority accepted 
and legitimized the supposed, and unsubstantiated, harmful ideology of the 
veil ascribed by France.63 Yet, “even assuming that such interpretations of 
the full-face veil are correct, it has to be stressed that there is no right not to 
be shocked or provoked by different models of cultural or religious identity, 
even those that are very different from the traditional French and European 
lifestyle.”64 It is patently contrary to European notions of religious and 
personal freedom to restrict someone’s attire merely because it demonstrates 
a radical opinion.65  
The dissent also found issue with France’s “living together” argument. 
Without justification, France presumed that it was impossible to 
communicate with someone wearing a veil.66 At the same time, there is a 
well-recognized right to privacy, which could even be construed as a “right 
to be an outsider.”67 To support France’s argument, the court would 
effectively recognize a right of someone to contact any other person in a 
public space regardless of the other person’s will.68 Not only is this right 
illogical, but the underlying assumption is equally irrational: there is no 
evidence that one cannot communicate with someone whose face is 
obscured.69 It would be ridiculous to claim that someone wearing a helmet, 
costume, or ski mask cannot speak to another person.70 Instead, the dissent 
singled out the true justification for the ban and the majority’s decision: 
“selective pluralism and restricted tolerance” to different cultures.71 When 
faced with a culture expressing radically different norms, it was simpler to 
ban the nonconformity to European norms rather than attempt to understand 
this culture or even S.A.S.’s position on the veil. Thus, the broad margin of 
appreciation granted to France by the court enabled it to trammel the rights 
of a religious minority, likely resulting in further exclusion and increased 
oppression.72 
                                                                                                                     
61 Id. ¶ 137. 
62 Id. ¶ 6 (Nussberger, J., and Jäderblom, J., dissenting).  
63 Id.  
64 Id. ¶ 7. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. ¶ 8. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. ¶ 9. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. ¶ 14. 
72 See id. ¶ 21 (arguing that the ban will serve to worsen the exclusion of Muslim women from 
society). 
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C. The Aftermath of S.A.S. 
In the time since S.A.S. was decided, the ECHR has decided two similar 
cases––Belcacemi & Oussar v. Belgium and Dakir v. Belgium––addressing 
the Belgian ban referenced in S.A.S.73 Both of these cases effectively retread 
the same arguments presented in S.A.S.: an applicant suing for violation of 
articles 8 and 9 while Belgium claims a legitimate aim in preserving the 
rights of its citizens to “liv[e] together.”74 Applying the same wide margin 
of appreciation utilized in S.A.S., the court likewise concluded that 
Belgium’s ban was a permissible intrusion on the freedom of religion.75 
However, these cases also further expanded the margin of appreciation 
granted to the right of living together. In S.A.S., the court recognized that “in 
view of the flexibility of the notion of ‘living together’ and the resulting risk 
of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the necessity of 
the impugned limitation.”76 Alternatively, in the Belgian cases, the court has 
seemingly discarded this careful examination; instead, the court was 
satisfied by the bare showing that the Belgian ban was democratically 
created.77 Moreover, while S.A.S. addressed the potential harmful social 
effects on Muslim women,78 there was no comparable discussion in either 
Dakir or Belcacemi. In total, this suggests an even greater shift in power in 
favor of the states than was first granted in S.A.S. As of now, it seems that a 
state may pass any restriction on religion so long as it is justified by the need 
to “live together,” regardless of the social stigma created by the ban. 
Indeed, in the years following S.A.S., a number of similar bans have been 
adopted throughout Europe. In May of 2018, Denmark passed a nation-wide 
ban on the veil.79 Similar to the French ban, the Danish law likewise used 
neutral language prohibiting any “garment that hides the face.”80 Likewise, 
Austria passed a general prohibition on the veil in October 2017 that 
mirrored the language used in France’s law.81 In Switzerland, although its 
                                                                                                                     
73 Dakir v. Belgium, App. No. 4619/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶¶ 1, 3 [hereinafter Dakir], 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%224619/12%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-
175660%22]}; Belcacemi & Oussar v. Belgium, App. No. 37798/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶¶ 1, 3 
[hereinafter Belcacemi], https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-175141%22]}. 
74 Dakir, supra note 73, ¶¶ 3, 21; Belcacemi, supra note 73, ¶¶ 3, 18. 
75 Dakir, supra note 73, ¶ 54; Belcacemi, supra note 73, ¶ 51. 
76 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 122. 
77 Dakir, supra note 73, ¶¶ 57–58. 
78 E.g., S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 151 (acknowledging that the ban primarily affects Muslim women 
wishing to wear the full-face veil). 
79 Martin Selsoe Sorensen & Megan Specia, Denmark’s Ban on Muslim Face Veil Is Met with 
Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/denmark-ban-
muslim-veil.html. 
80 Id. 
81 Christine Hauser & Liam Stack, Dutch Lawmakers Approve Partial Ban on Burqas and Niqabs, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/world/europe/netherlands-face-
covering-ban.html?module=inline. A few nations have also passed minor bans that warrant less 
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federal government opposed such a move, two of its cantons have adopted 
public bans on the veil.82 Most recently, the Dutch parliament––despite 
earlier pronouncements by its Council of State83—passed a new ban that 
prohibits face coverings in schools, government offices, and hospitals 
without limiting their use in public.84 The creator of this law celebrated this 
achievement on Twitter using the hashtags “stopislam” and “deislamize.”85  
II. INTERPRETING S.A.S. 
There are multiple modes of interpreting S.A.S. and far too many to fully 
discuss here. Yet, three prominent interpretations reveal a consistent 
problem with S.A.S. First, S.A.S. is often derided for representing the ills of 
secularist policy as it violates religious freedoms. Moreover, this policy even 
spills into supporting assimilation of religious minorities into the majority—
in France, Christianity. Lastly, proponents of S.A.S. and bans on the veil 
ignore these realities and push forward a counter-factualist agenda. These 
problems stem from a common cause: an excessively broad margin of 
appreciation that enables France to neglect religious freedoms without any 
oversight. 
A. Secularism 
An ever-present concern in S.A.S. was France’s desire to remain a 
secular nation and whether, in so doing, France abrogated the religious rights 
of its citizens. France’s secularist approach to religion is codified within its 
own Constitution of 1958: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens 
before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect 
all beliefs.”86 Generally, the implementation of French secularism is 
ostensibly founded on the notion that the state acts neutrally towards all 
religious matters.87 While public events are secular, religious denominations 
are supposed to enjoy legal equality, and non-discrimination laws prevent 
                                                                                                                     
discussion. A ban on face coverings while driving, as well as for anyone working in civil service, the 
military, or for an election, recently went into effect in Germany. Id. Bulgaria also now bans the veil in 
government offices, schools, and cultural institutions. Id. 
82 Michael Shields, Swiss Canton Becomes Second to Ban Burqas in Public, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-burqas/swiss-canton-becomes-second-to-ban-burqas-
in-public-idUSKCN1M30J2. 
83 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 52. 
84 Hauser & Stack, supra note 81. 
85 Id.; Geert Wilders (@geertwilderspvv), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 1:46 AM), 
https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1011893627184930816?lang=en. 
86 1958 CONST. pmbl. art. 1 (Fr.). 
87 Lasia Bloss, European Law of Religion: Organizational and Institutional Analysis of National 
Systems and Their Implications for the Future European Integration Process 21 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. 
Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 13/03, 2003). 
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differential treatment to individuals based on their beliefs.88 As a result, 
France does not maintain official statistics of religious demographics.89 
Nonetheless, third party surveyors estimate that 80% of France’s population 
is Roman Catholic.90 Muslims constitute the second largest religious group 
with three million followers (approximately 4.5% of the population).91 
Meanwhile, 6% of the population is unaffiliated and 1% is Jewish.92 As one 
might anticipate from these demographics though, France’s implementation 
of its secularism has often skewed in favor of the majority beliefs to the 
detriment of the minority. 
Despite France’s claim to be a secular state, scholars have noted that 
France’s historic roots have bound it to Judeo-Christian traditions resulting 
in selective application of this secularist policy.93 Because of a historical 
connection to the Catholic Church, local governments in the Alsace and 
Moselle regions along with French Guyana maintain formal connections 
with the Catholic Church.94 In these areas, Christian and Jewish 
denominations are treated as public institutions and receive state subsidies 
and public funding.95 This explicit religious connection in Alsace and 
Moselle, in particular, is due to the unique history of the region. Under 
Napoleon’s Concordat with the Pope in 1801, Catholicism was established 
as the national religion of France.96 This decree was eventually overturned 
in 1905 when France enacted a strict separation of church and state, which 
has since formed the backbone of its secularism policy.97 However, in 1905, 
Alsace and Moselle were part of Germany and the new law did not apply to 
them.98 Although these regions have since become a part of France once 
again, they have retained their political ties to the Catholic Church; as recent 
as 2013, the French Constitutional Council reaffirmed the validity of this 
policy when rejecting a claim that it violated French secularism.99 In French 
tax policy, a number of Christian and Jewish denominations also enjoy 
tax-exempt status, while other faiths, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, are 
subjected to a 60% tax on all funds they receive.100  
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More recently, in the early 2000s, there was a documented shift in the 
language describing this principle of secularism from a focus in organizing 
public life to defending national values from a foreign threat.101 Two French 
government reports submitted in 2003 declared that “political Islam” was 
the primary threat to the Republic.102 Following these reports, right-wing 
French politicians became fixated on secularism and defending against this 
supposed threat of Islam.103 A few months later, another report was 
published that posited secularism as essential to maintaining social and 
political integration.104 Ultimately, drawing on the conclusions of these 
reports, then-French President Jacques Chirac established the “Commission 
Reflecting on the Application of the Principle of Secularism in the 
Republic.”105 One signature policy achievement from this commission was 
the institution of a ban on religious garb in public schools, which resulted in 
singling out hijab-wearing Muslim students.106 
Consequently, as evident in S.A.S., France’s secularist policy has a 
tendency to single out Islam and prevent Muslim forms of religious 
expression. While there is general acceptance for displaying crosses and 
kippas (or yarmulkes), the wearing of veils and hijabs has often been 
targeted by bans on religious garb.107 While Christians and Jews have long 
lived in France, it was not until the French Muslim population grew 
substantially that these bans began to emerge.108 These policies even tend to 
privilege atheists above all others, since they are not compelled by faith to 
wear religious garb that might run afoul of the law.109 Although secularism 
was not discussed outright in S.A.S., it still permeates France’s “living 
together” argument.110 In essence, secularism is so fundamental in French 
society that it is impossible to live together unless someone’s religious garb 
is stripped from them.111 More still, French secularism has led to a 
hyper-fixation on the perceived ideology of the veil. For years in France, 
veil-wearing women have been cast as a source of menace and fear.112 Akin 
to the way that tabloids treat celebrities, Muslim women have been subjected 
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to intense public scrutiny such that everyone in France can immediately 
recognize a veil even without ever meeting someone who wears one.113 
Under intense public scrutiny, “[g]ossip circuits” form in which people 
create their own meaning for the veil.114 Consequently, the French 
perception of the veil is founded on a “meaning” of the veil deprived of any 
direct experience with the veil.115 Framing the issue in this light, France is 
enabled by its secularist policy to restrict the veil and completely disregard 
the opinions of actual veil-wearers, including S.A.S.116  
Furthermore, French secularist policy is rife with contradictions and 
arbitrary decision making. In order to defend secularism, France is actually 
forced to define and categorize religious practices, which only serves to 
further enmesh French politics in religion.117 Clearly, unless France wishes 
to completely destroy individual freedoms, it must determine what actions 
have religious connotations, and therefore are prohibited, and which actions 
are acceptable.118 Of course, this determination is still rooted in the 
Judeo-Christian traditions of France in which Christian traditions have long 
been incorporated into the actual functioning of the government.119 France–
–along with many other nations––employs double standards when 
interacting with different religions. While France is clearly comfortable in 
recognizing the multiple denominations of Christianity to the point of 
excluding certain ones from tax exemptions,120 Islam is typically treated as 
a monolithic religion with only one perspective.121 Ultimately, to some 
observers, French secularism is merely pretext to justify institutionalized 
favoritism of certain beliefs at a significant determinant to religious 
minorities, particularly Muslims.122 
French secularism has also influenced and, at times, impaired its 
international relationships. Despite a longstanding commitment to human 
rights, France has been noticeably reticent to adopt international protections 
for these rights.123 France can claim ownership of the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen that contributed to the groundwork of the 
Convention as well as being a founding member of the Council of Europe; 
yet, France did not ratify the Convention until 1974 and only accepted 
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individual petitions beginning in 1981—twenty-eight years after the 
Convention came into effect.124 This reluctance has been attributed to its 
policy of secularism alongside the brutality inflicted by France during the 
Algerian war.125 Moreover, France was likewise hesitant in ratifying other 
international human rights agreements, including the International Bill of 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.126 The ECHR’s 
decision in S.A.S. was also not the first foray into international review of 
France’s secularist policy. The ECHR has previously reviewed, and upheld, 
similar bans on religious attire in schools in suits brought by Muslim 
students.127 Similar to S.A.S., the ECHR has likewise allowed this policy of 
secularism to persist under the margin of appreciation.128 
B. Forced Assimilation 
National policies, such as the veil ban at issue in S.A.S., also carry the 
dangerous potential of inflicting a majority culture on every citizen to the 
extent of eliminating any diversity. Indeed, one perversion of the secularism 
policy discussed above is that it completely turns state norms of neutrality 
on their head: rather than the state being responsible for religious neutrality, 
it is instead incumbent on individual citizens to behave neutrally.129 In 
essence, devout citizens, particularly those of minority religions, must 
assimilate to whatever standard the nation declares to be neutral and secular. 
Worse still, the very decision of S.A.S. appears to hold that “the ‘right of 
others’; the majority, is to be imposed on the minority as a measure of social 
cohesion and mandatory engagement even where the minority do not request 
such engagement or deem it desirable.”130 France’s “living together” 
argument is not just that it protects the right of socialization; the essence of 
the argument is that states can impose these social obligations against the 
will of the individual.131 Under this reasoning, a state is well within its 
powers to further enshrine a majority culture while castigating any 
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nonconformists.132 Following S.A.S., a state can just as easily prohibit any 
other innocuous religious practice simply because the majority finds such 
practice distasteful.133 
The decision in S.A.S. thwarts the purposes of the Convention by 
enabling these types of policies. When enacted, the Convention was 
supposed to embody longstanding egalitarian principles and prevent cultural 
subjugation and intolerance.134 The Convention was also a direct response 
to the rise of Nazism and fascism in the first half of the twentieth century.135 
From its inception, the Convention was thus conceived as a shield against 
the injustices that a state might inflict upon its people.136 As a result of this 
noble policy, the ECHR gained considerable respect and recognition from 
both national and international actors.137 Yet, now, that supposed shield is 
being used to batter a religious minority at the behest of a majority. Instead 
of furthering the purpose of the Convention, the decision in S.A.S. could 
easily further the practices that it was supposed to prevent. Fascism and 
nationalism are once more on the rise in Europe.138 Across the continent, 
parties such as the British National Party, English Defense League, Austria’s 
Freedom Party, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland party have 
garnered considerable strength and advocate similar party goals of the 
European fascists of the early-twentieth century: under the guise of 
populism, or helping the common person, these groups articulate a hatred of 
foreigners and strong desire to impose a national, or majoritarian, culture on 
the people.139 In this context, S.A.S. is particularly dangerous. Relying solely 
on the democratic legitimacy of the state’s restriction of religion––as the 
ECHR continues to do in S.A.S. and its progeny140––cannot be the only 
consideration employed when determining permissible impairment of legal 
rights.141 Nazism was a legal entity, supported by the political machinations 
of Germany, and garnered majority support.142 Under S.A.S., fascism and 
Nazism can become a valid policy so long as it is supported by “democratic 
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legitimacy,” regardless of whether the policy violates essential human 
rights.143 
These outcomes are not simply hypothetical either; indeed, the 
repercussions of a similar Chinese national policy enforcing socialization 
are already observable and foretell the potential outcomes of France’s 
“living together” agenda. In the far northwest of China lies the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region that is home to the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic 
and majority Muslim population.144 In total, contemporary China has 
fifty-six officially recognized ethnicities with the Han culture composing the 
majority of the population in mainland China.145 Rather than recognize the 
diversity of ethnicities across its nation, the Chinese government has 
preferred to reimagine its population as a singular culture and a single 
identity.146 A 2009 statement from the Ministry of Information reflects this 
belief that: “From ancient times until today, many ethnic groups have lived 
on the territory of Xinjiang. Every ethnic group who has ever laboured, 
existed, and multiplied in Xinjiang has been a member of the Chinese nation 
(zhonghua minzu).”147 This document further claimed that “[e]thnic unity is 
the means by which the frontier can be civilised,” and “ethnic unity is 
prosperity, ethnic separation is disaster.”148 Drawing on these contentions of 
a single unified national identity, China has long-imposed a policy that is 
comparable to the French “living together” notion: the minzu tuanjie 
(nationality unity) and minzu pingdeng (nationality equality).149 These 
policies envisage the “fading away of ethnicity” and the “fusion” of all the 
ethnic groups as key to the success of the country.150 
China’s policies have particularly impacted the Uyghur population. 
Under what amounts to the same “living together” justification as argued by 
France in S.A.S., China has spent decades stifling religious expression of the 
Uyghurs in an effort to assimilate them into the majority culture.151 Similar 
to the French veil ban, the Chinese policies expressly define what types of 
religious expression are socially acceptable.152 For instance, the Chinese 
government prevents Muslim parents from teaching their children their 
religion, prevents adults and children from attending mosques, bans 
pilgrimages to Mecca, and prevents male Muslim teachers from growing a 
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beard.153 Worse still, Muslims are frequently prohibited from fasting during 
Ramadan, which is a central tenet of the Muslim faith.154 These bans are 
often premised on the notion of “preventing use of schools and government 
offices to promote religion” or, in other words, maintaining secularism as a 
national policy.155 Most similar to France’s ban on the veil, one report 
described a similar censure of Muslim attire:  
Around the corner from Kashgar’s 572-year-old Id Kah 
Mosque, a large notice board implores Uyghurs to adopt 
modern attire. One half of the board is covered in pictures 
depicting traditional Uyghurs, women in colourful dresses and 
flowing hair and clean-shaven men. The other half shows rows 
of men with beards and women in headscarves or 
face-covering veils, all with a red X over them.156 
In total, the Chinese policies against the Uyghurs plainly seek to 
eliminate any behavior that deviates from the norms of the majority culture 
and its traditions. 
However, rather than build a strong national community and foster 
social cohesion as intended, China’s policies towards the Uyghurs have only 
caused strife and political violence. Among Uyghurs there is a pervasive 
feeling of a “cultural genocide.”157 Naturally, this has also fueled feelings of 
powerlessness and a sense that Beijing will inevitably destroy every aspect 
of their culture.158 Much of the resentment felt by the Uyghurs towards 
Beijing has been expressed through non-violent means.159 However, some 
have acted more extremely, choosing to assault Chinese security forces and 
non-Uyghur settlers in the region with terrible acts of violence.160 
Responding to this violence, the Chinese government has enacted further 
repression of the Uyghurs in order to root out the “terrorist threat from 
Muslim Uighurs.”161 In addition to the assimilationist policies, the Uyghurs 
now also suffer extensive surveillance and censorship.162 As the conflict 
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stands, Uyghur resentment of the state is at an all-time high and there is 
growing support for an Uyghur separatist movement.163 Yet, at the same 
time, China continues to restrict the rights of the Uyghurs and is unlikely to 
alter this policy anytime soon.164 
While the Uyghurs’ treatment by the Chinese government is certainly 
an extreme example, it provides a magnification of the protracted 
ramifications of the decision in S.A.S. The ethnic strife in China did not begin 
overnight; rather, it is the product of decades of slow-building conflict that 
is most visible now that the violence and oppression is openly visible to 
outside observers. Comparatively, France is at a far earlier stage in its 
treatment of veil-wearing Muslim women. So far there is but one ban that 
only affects a (supposedly) small portion of the Muslim population. Yet, this 
one law has already sowed seeds of considerable division and social unrest. 
S.A.S. described that harassment and fear she experienced every time that 
she wore her veil in public.165 S.A.S.’s experience was not an outlier. Scores 
of other women likewise reported that they felt intimidated, silenced, and 
forced into seclusion as a result of this law.166 Not only does this law codify 
a legal division between veil-wearing Muslims and the rest of the populace, 
it also fostered Islamophobic sentiments among the population as well. It is 
hardly an outlandish conclusion to think that this policy might equally fuel 
Muslim resentment of the French government. If more anti-Muslim policies 
follow, it may be only a matter of time until the relationship between France 
and its Muslim population mirrors the conflict between the Uyghurs and the 
Chinese government.  
C. Counter-Factualism 
The decision in S.A.S. enables another common facet in fascist regimes: 
a distaste for concrete evidence in favor of legislating based on cultural 
biases. As mentioned in Part I, the French parliament enacted the veil ban 
under the guidance of a report detailing the commonality of the veil and its 
religious significance. To add further detail, this was a 658-page report that 
consulted 200 witnesses and experts and even sent questionnaires to 
numerous French embassies.167 However, the creators of this report never 
intended to interview any veil-wearing women, and only interviewed a 
single veil-wearer after she requested to be heard.168 In other words, France 
passed a law to regulate the behavior of an entire religion when it had little 
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information as to why these practices were observed. Moreover, both France 
and the ECHR conveniently disregarded substantial empirical evidence that 
undermined France’s policy. Prior to the ban, empirical research 
demonstrated that veil-wearing women led “average” lives and routinely 
engaged in common social activities, including “contact with others at 
school (picking up children), in shops, [and in] administrative offices.”169 
While other non-veil-wearers perceived a barrier to communication, there 
was no evidence that these women were actively secluding themselves from 
socialization.170 Instead, the evidence submitted to the ECHR by France 
itself demonstrates that the ban impaired the social participation of these 
women.171 Likewise, another report submitted to the court demonstrated that 
“[t]he ban and public discourse seems to have implicitly legitimized the 
abusive treatment of veiled women.”172 Ultimately, there was no evidentiary 
support for the ban and, instead, both France and the ECHR opted to rely on 
baseless assumptions of the meaning of the veil. 
Had France or the ECHR considered the experiences of people who 
actually wear the veil, they would have been exposed to perspectives that 
are very different from those reflected in the legislative history of the ban. 
Eva Brems, a professor of human rights law, conducted a number of 
interviews with French women who wear the veil, which reveal a narrative 
contrary to the presumptions employed by France.173 One woman recalled 
that, prior to the ban:  
At the time I lived in a neighborhood of old people . . . . And 
these people recognized me without any problem and they 
acted toward me as if they saw whoever else in the street . . . . 
We were good neighbors, and I remember that when we 
moved, the old people were even sad because they told us: 
“Oh, we knew you so well and we knew that we could count 
on you, that we could ask you something.”174 
Some women even recalled that their social interactions helped to 
remedy negative biases:  
In a supermarket, people told me “madam, why do you wear 
that?” I came closer to a gentleman and told him what the 
religion says. It is not mandatory but if you do it on your own 
initiative . . . . He told me “maybe your husband forced you.” 
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I said “you see, I do my shopping all alone, and I drive alone, 
there is nobody with me.” And he was satisfied.175 
However, the experiences of these women changed drastically after the 
ban was enacted. One woman with a two-and-a-half-year-old son is too 
afraid to accompany him when he goes to play in the park.176 Another 
described her harassment: 
Last time I went to Auchan (supermarket EB), a mob formed 
around me and people were saying “what are you doing here? 
It’s forbidden! You have no right to go out entirely veiled. It’s 
banned, it’s illegal. Go back to your country.” [I] feel like a 
monster. Even pedophiles and criminals, are not treated like 
that . . . . We are seen as less than nothing, not as human 
beings.177 
Once again, the experience of veil-wearers demonstrates the 
counter-productive effect of the ban on veils.  
Importantly, the legislative history also neglected to consider the 
personal meanings that veil-wearers attribute to the veil. One woman 
described the veil as “[m]y veil is my chastity, it is my behavior, it is my 
politeness, it is my respect.”178 Another woman found herself empowered by 
the veil: “A woman who is completely veiled, for me she is a woman with 
strength, with enormous self-confidence. . . . You need it very much.”179 
Several women rejected the claim that they only wear the veil because a man 
has forced them to do so. “It’s really, really humiliating and degrading for 
the personality of a Muslim girl, to hear someone say morning and evening 
‘it’s the men who submit you, it’s the men who oblige you.’”180 Brems’s 
interviews revealed that most veil-wearers only see the veil as a symbol—a 
sign of religious devotion—and that the veil is unrelated to behavior or 
gender relations.181 Indeed, the interviewees displayed varied and nuanced 
stances on gender equality. One woman expressed that: “I do not want to be 
equal to a man, I want to remain a woman, I don’t want to do the work of a 
woman and a mother and do the work of a man on top of that.”182 Meanwhile, 
a different woman offered a comparative experience: 
I went to Egypt and met women with a burqa who were 
lawyers, doctors. I also want to be like that, to achieve 
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something more. I can study, I can work, I can do the same 
things as any other woman or man. . . . At my house, we are 
two to vacuum, two to prepare meals, two to bathe the 
children, two to change the diapers, two to do the shopping, 
two to babysit.183 
Overall, many veil-wearers would prefer not to be forced to choose 
between expressing their religious devotion or pursuing a career and life 
outside of the household.184 
Finally, there is an inherent illogic in the construction of the French ban, 
along with similar bans. Notably, the exceptions to the ban are irrational 
when the law is solely justified by the need to protect the rights of 
socialization. These exceptions allow full-face coverings for sport, work, 
and festivals.185 Yet if socialization is so important that a woman must be 
forced to change her clothing whenever she goes out into public, there is no 
reason why these exceptions should exist because they are also the bane of 
social interaction.186 Furthermore, the rationale for the ban was similarly 
untethered from logical justification. While a state may certainly impose 
certain requirements on its populace given solid legal or moral 
justification—e.g., prohibiting murder or requiring jury service––there is no 
similar justification for arbitrarily inflicting the norms of a majority culture 
on religious minorities.187 As the Council of State in the Netherlands rightly 
noted, the only justification for this policy lies in “the subjective insecurity” 
of the cultural majority.188  
III. S.A.S. AND THE WIDE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
While there is certainly a myriad of problems presented by the ECHR’s 
decision in S.A.S., each of the aforementioned dilemmas stems from a 
common cause: the wide margin of appreciation employed by the court. 
Oftentimes, the critiques of S.A.S. fixate on how France’s actions go well 
beyond the norm and clearly abrogate fundamental freedoms. Yet, these 
actions are only possible because of a lack of international oversight. The 
ECHR abdicated its duty to protect religious liberty and enabled France’s 
bad actions. Indeed, this margin of appreciation standard is likely primarily 
responsible for the spread of these bans, which will only further exacerbate 
the problems noted in the critiques.  
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Under the margin of appreciation, the ECHR has empowered France’s 
secularist policy. Implicit in the decision in S.A.S. is the notion that French 
society is so steeped with notions of secularism that this policy must be 
allowed to continue. Put differently, the court has effectively declared that 
secularism is a core French value.189 Without critical evaluation, the court 
has enshrined French secularism. Yet, this ignores ample evidence that 
French secularism is actually biased by its historic Judeo-Christian roots.190 
Given the continued affirmation of this policy by the court,191 it is highly 
unlikely that it will ever engage in the critical evaluation necessary to realize 
the faults of French secularism. 
Likewise, the wide margin of appreciation has emboldened 
assimilationist and nationalist movements that seek to create a single 
national culture. When S.A.S. was decided, only two European nations had 
enacted bans on the veil.192 Currently, however, eight nations employ some 
variation of a veil ban, and more are likely to follow.193 Even in the United 
Kingdom, which France has derided as too liberal in its acceptance of the 
veil,194 a recent poll revealed that a majority of people support a burqa ban.195 
Without international oversight, the hyper-fixation on eliminating the veil is 
likely to continue. These nations have become obsessed with the perception 
that the veil somehow impairs a person’s ability to integrate into the 
society.196 It is also incredibly easy to justify these bans to the ECHR. Under 
the wide margin of appreciation, nations are allowed to impose the social 
norms of the majority culture upon any divergent minority group. 
Furthermore, as evident in the court’s recent decisions in favor of Belgium’s 
ban on the veil, the margin of appreciation allows these bans simply upon a 
showing that the nation followed its normal legislative procedure.197 In 
effect, should a nation descend into fascism and wish to annihilate a religious 
minority, there is little that the court could do under this margin of 
appreciation standard if the legislature approved of the transition to 
fascism.198 Without oversight, there is little standing in the way of a 
European nation treating its Muslim population the same way that the 
Chinese treat the Uyghurs.  
                                                                                                                     
189 Savić, supra note 107, at 679. 
190 Supra Part II.A. 
191 The ECHR has routinely affirmed this policy in Dogru, S.A.S., and the recent Belgian cases. 
192 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 40. 
193 Supra Part I.C. 
194 S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 16. 
195 The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (May 31, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
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Furthermore, when enacting these bans, there is little need to rely on any 
empirical evidence—or even actual evidence—to support claims that the 
veils inhibit social interaction. The ECHR’s margin of appreciation is so 
broad that the court just accepts at face value the claim that the veil impairs 
the wearer’s ability to communicate. The court decided this despite clear 
evidence to the contrary.199 In fact, the margin of appreciation granted to 
France’s principle of living together is more permissive than other standards 
in this regard. When the court dismissed the claim that the veil impairs 
gender equality, it reflected that there was no concrete support to this 
claim.200 However, that same rigor was not applied to analyzing the dearth 
of evidence in support of the “living together” argument. As a result, under 
this lenient margin of appreciation standard, there is no protection against 
capricious state action that is untethered from reality. 
CONCLUSION 
The margin of appreciation is a conflict inherent to the construction of 
the Convention. It simultaneously declares a right to religious expression 
and accords nations the ability to abrogate that freedom, albeit under certain 
circumstances. In order for both to coexist, there must be a balance; the 
interests of the states must be balanced against the religious interests of all 
the citizens. S.A.S. disrupts the traditional balance of the margin of 
appreciation. The ECHR enabled France to privilege the interests of some 
of its citizens above the rights of veil-wearing women. Indeed, this 
favoritism is already apparent in French secularism. While Judeo-Christian 
traditions often remain acceptable under this policy, Islamic customs are 
frequently targeted and rebuked; the policy itself even appears to stem from 
bald Islamophobia. Likewise, the court’s margin of appreciation standard 
found it equally palatable that France openly sought to root out minority 
cultures in order to impose a unified national identity. Perhaps most 
disturbing is the near-complete abandonment of judicial review of these 
policies. The court has seemingly no interest in reviewing the factual basis, 
or lack thereof, of veil bans. So long as these religious restrictions pass 
through legislative bodies, the S.A.S. margin of appreciation requires no 
further inquiry to find the law permissible. Through this standard, the court 
has effectively ceded its authority in preventing religious discrimination.  
The threat posed by anti-Muslim policies now gaining strength in 
Europe is not mere conjecture. The current fate of the Uyghur population in 
China reveals the danger lurking in Europe’s future should these policies 
continue. Under policies resembling French secularism and the “living 
together” argument, the Chinese government has enacted a cultural genocide 
against the Uyghurs. If France can force Muslim women to remove their 
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veils without repercussion, it is hardly a stretch of the imagination to 
consider that France could also force Muslim men to shave, restrict access 
to Mosques, or even prohibit celebration of Ramadan, as China has done. 
Moreover, as China has experienced, these policies have encouraged acts of 
terror and violence against civilians. Rather than unify the country, these 
policies have created a deep schism between the Uyghurs and the rest of 
China. For the same reasons, continuing towards this claimed goal of “living 
together,” or forced assimilation, as it is better described, is likely to end in 
the same result for France. 
The threat posed by these policies is especially salient at this moment in 
time given the rise in nationalism and fascism in Europe. In recent years, 
parties such as the British National Party, the English Defense League, 
Austria’s Freedom Party, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland have 
gained strength in their respective countries. Many of these parties articulate 
a desire for a single national culture, typically one that is white and Christian. 
While these parties have not gained majority support per se, some of these 
views have garnered majority support. A majority of the United Kingdom 
supports a ban on the veil. Moreover, as demonstrated in this Note, France’s 
veil ban, despite a troubling desire to mandate cultural norms, garnered 
near-unanimous support in the French parliament. Should these nationalist 
parties gain actual majority support, they could easily enact further 
restrictions to enforce cultural norms and progress further towards the 
current crisis of the Uyghurs in China. 
Now, Europe is not destined to treat its Muslim population the same as 
China. Unlike China, there is a dedicated system designed to prevent such 
human rights abuses: the European Court of Human Rights. However, in 
order to prevent this, the court actually needs to perform as intended and 
conduct oversight of these policies. Without the court, there is nothing 
stopping these nations and the growing nationalist movements therein from 
following China’s example. The margin of appreciation applied in S.A.S. is 
simply too broad to uphold the purposes of the Convention. If article 9 is to 
have any value going forward, this standard must change. 
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